Persuasion of a privately informed receiver – Kyiv School of Eco

Search for: [] Kyiv School of Economics Kyiv School of Economics Programs Degree Executive and professionalization Courses Archived Programs Research Research Centers Research Papers Educational Programs Academic Seminars People Alumni Faculty Researchers Staff Vacancies Events About the School Leadership Team News Impact Mission Contacts International Studies Office Support Us Make a gift Our partners Kyiv School of Economics Kyiv School of Economics Programs Degree Executive and professionalization Courses Archived Programs Research Research Centers Research Papers Educational Programs Academic Seminars People Alumni Faculty Researchers Staff Vacancies Events About the School Leadership Team News Impact Mission Contacts International Studies Office Support Us Make a gift Our partners Persuasion of a privately informed receiver The academic paper written by Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ming Li. Kyiv School of Economics Persuasion of a privately informed receiver Persuasion of a privately informed receiver Abstract: We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver’s report about his type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments. We characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms. In particular, if the density of the receiver’s type is log-concave, then the optimal persuasion mechanism reveals the state if and only if it is below a threshold. We apply our results to the design of media censorship policies. The research was published in the scientific journal Econometrics in 2017. To find the article, please follow the link . Authors Anton Kolotilin Senior Lecturer in Economics at UNSW Business School Tymofiy Mylovanov KSE President, Associate Professor of the University of Pittsburgh, former Minister of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine Andy Zapechelnyuk Professor of Economics at the University of St. Andrews Ming Li Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Concordia University Donate © 2021, Ukraine Kyiv School of Economics Mykoly Shpaka St, 3 +38 044 492 80 12 +38 067 434 72 06 [email protected] Donate Facebook Medium YouTube Newsletter Telegram Instagram Twitter