2. The Euro-Atlantic Axis - UkraineTrek.com

[http://www.ukrainetrek.com] home site map contact us add a link bookmark us discussion forum Welcome! Let's trek UkraineTrek.com now! It is the best site if you want to know plenty of important information about Ukraine. Central Ukraine | Western Ukraine | Eastern Ukraine | Southern Ukraine 2. The Euro-Atlantic Axis « previous page | content | next page » a) West-European States and the Problems of European Integration The "strategic openness" of both partners is one of the potential promotional factors in the development of relations between Ukraine and leading West-European states and in the integration of Ukraine into European cooperation and security structures. Ukraine as well as the European community (both the institution and national states) formulate strategies for their development and attempt to determine their specific roles and models of survival for the future. This search for identity in a rapidly changing environment allows partners the opportunity to actively participate in determining each other's goals and priorities. This process is already taking place. Let us recall, for instance, Ukraine's efforts in promoting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members or the European Council's actions in persuading Ukraine to abolish the death penalty. However, strategic openness and geopolitical indetermination can become a barrier on the road to Ukraine's integration into the European community. Moreover, threats to Ukrainian security, including the conflictogenical process of the formation and growth in power of national and local political and economic élites, the neglect of democratic norms in the day-to-day existence of Ukrainian governing organs and society, etc., can only drive attention away from "external" relations with West-European states that do not propose adequate solutions for acute Ukrainian domestic contradictions. In order to prevent a "turning away from Europe" it is necessary to underline the geopolitical importance of broadening bilateral relations with West-European states and of strengthening integrative processes. It is also necessary to demonstrate the practical benefits that arise from this kind of cooperation, and the opportunities for the adaptation of European experience on Ukrainian ground. One of the possible scenarios for the strengthening of these integrative processes is proposed below. In order to maximize westward policy it would be worthwhile to more fully utilize the advantages of the poliarchic model that was developed in the bilateral relations of West-European states. The essence of this model is based on the premise that regional integration is closely connected to the processes of decentralization and regionalization. Additionally, interstate relations in the EU, for instance, are determined and formed not only by state bureaucratic institutions or the bodies of the Union itself. Growing in importance are contacts between separate individuals, non-governmental organizations and structures, and direct relations between regions (federal lands, provinces) of various states. It would therefore be important for Ukraine to begin the process of the diversification of relations with West-European states, giving priority to the non-governmental level of these relations and involving as wide as possible circle of societal sectors. Also worth keeping in mind is the structural and organizational multi-facetedness of European integration, of which Ukraine aspires to become an active member. On the one hand, this is a process of state blocking inside the EU. The activity of temporary (or regular) coalitions and unilateral initiatives of this or that state are directed toward solving those problems that belong to the spheres in which these coalitions or states are leaders. The "breakthrough" of some leads to the "gingering" of others. Coalitions and alliances within the parameters of the CIS, for instance, are directed first of all toward disintegration, toward the blockage of these or other generally integrative initiatives. On the other hand, the EU as the heart of European integrative processes is not the sole mechanism for the bringing together of member-states. We can mention a whole number of institutions (the Council of Europe, NATO, the WEU etc.) that add their own specifics to the integrational complex. In the development of foreign-policy strategy it would be important to consider the fact that despite their long-standing tradition of cooperation, West-European states have not solved the problems of delegating state mandates to the center. This dilemma finds its most vivid expression during the trials of the development of mutual foreign and security policies of the EU, and in discussions concerning defense policy and the creation of a European army. This contradiction will apparently never be fully resolved within the framework of the EU. This is why European integration is acquiring the form of a balancing of national interests and a balancing of relations between state and supranational bureaucracies. This balancing ensures the preservation of national sovereignty and ably used becomes one of the factors that stimulates the majority of integrative processes. Ukraine should more widely utilize the experience of EU member-states in defending its national interests, in searching for mutually acceptable compromises, etc. Relations with the region's states and with European institutions should not develop into a "game with one net", where one side forces the other to accept its prescriptions and scenarios. The poliarchic model of development became possible in Europe due to the fact that integration was at first born and developed in the economic sphere , gradually evolving to the level of the development of common political approaches. The establishment of one state's political domination is made impossible by the prime importance of the economic sphere, the "dictate" of its market model, and the severe necessity to compete with the USA and with APR states. The bureaucratic system of the European Union has used the same principle and has rendered impossible one state's control of any committee or of any direction of integration. West-European integrative processes have never been the object of short-term political speculation and maneuvers , always having remained as issues of strategic weight. Supporters and adversaries of integration have stable aware positions, calculated aware strategies and are forced to adapt them according to the conditions of their environment. Something opposite frequently occurs in Ukraine, and instead of being a strategically aware priority, integration becomes a declarative concept that is used as a tool in political battles. The utilization of the catch-words of European integration only as some kind of trump-card in the domestic political game and for the purpose of receiving the next portion of international aid will push Europeans away from Ukraine and will make our state less attractive for West-European capital. Despite the declarations about the geopolitical importance of orientation toward European states and structures, Ukraine has not developed a viable strategy for European integration , either on the basis of bilateral relations or on an institutional basis. The concept of strategy here indicates a complex model for the definition of the importance of this or that initiative, its goals and priorities, the ways and means for its realization, and the resources necessary to attain the announced goal. Ukraine, from this point of view, does not have a general national strategy concerning the solution of the complex tasks of European integration. Dozens of state institutions and official groups and committees are involved in the decision-making process along this direction. Because of the improper coordination of their efforts and the vague definition of their responsibilities and authority a significant part of the decisions made by state bureaucratic machinery are never put into practice. While meeting time constraints on all integrative initiatives Ukraine disperses its intellectual and material resources and frequently deals with routine secondary problems, leaving truly important initiatives without due attention and adequate resources. In other words, Ukraine's policy concerning West-European states and European institutions is too wide-ranging and non-constructive to be effective . An intensive approach to integration and bilateral relations should replace the extensive approach (where the number of events, trips and visits, and signed agreements overshadows their practical output, and political symbolism drives attention away from constructiveness and beneficial cooperation). Such "renewed" activity could be started in several priority directions: 1. The development of a national strategy for European integration. Such a strategy should become a document of "principal steps". It would be comprehensively strengthened by a material and intellectual plan of action that clearly defines the authority and responsibilities of various bodies, their reporting etc. Internal Ukrainian adaptation to European realities and the transformation of integration into a powerful generator for domestic change can be regarded as the main goal of strategy according to President Kuchma's Decree no. 615, dated June 11, 1998, entitled "The Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU". In order to develop an active national strategy with clear priorities and real expected results Ukraine would have to complete a revision of all integrative aspects and would have to select vital directions from among them. State resources, which are always scarce, should be concentrated toward the completion of these primary tasks. Separate mini-strategies should be developed for each goal that would ensure not only the declaration, as is the case today, but also the attainment of each goal. 2. The reaching of a correlation of values, norms and principles of Ukraine's internal political and social life with the norms and principles of the Euro-community. The following should be mentioned in this connection: · the democratization of the process of state decision-making (through the retraining of officials and the creation of conditions necessary for the effective activity of the mass-media and non-governmental institutions in controlling the processes of making and implementing decisions); · the attainment of a general national consensus concerning the main directions of Ukraine's European policy; · the creation of mechanisms of civil control over state institutions; · the conducting of a comprehensive educational campaign for primary and high-school students (assisted by the preparation of specific manuals) aimed at explaining the advantages of and the necessity for integration into the European community; · the arrangement of a youth exchange program based on existent European models; · the development of state policy for Ukrainian students/professionals studying abroad, the purpose of which would be the accumulation of a competitive national intellectual potential; · the organization of a coordinated long-term "Euro publicity campaign". Its goal, through the skillful use of the principles of mass-media techniques and influence over a mass audience, would be the orientation of society to the benefits and inevitability of integration. 3. The search for a strategic partner among European states. However paradoxical it may seem, the US is Ukraine's main lobbyist in Europe, especially in Euro-Atlantic structures. However, American support will soon only partly satisfy core Ukrainian demands in Europe, especially in the case of the "EURO's" successful introduction. This is on account of the growing political and economic world influence of the EU, the aspiration of Europeans for gaining leadership in the solution of the security problems of the continent, and the development of a conflict of interests between the European Union and the US. The "Europeanization" of Ukraine's continental lobby could commence in the following spheres: · the intensification of cooperation with West-European states; the establishment of a wide-ranging dialog between experts and scholars which could promote closer ties between Ukrainian and West-European political élites; · Ukraine's active participation in discussions concerning NATO's new Strategic Concept and NATO's role in Europe, with an accent on the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance; · the intensification of the dialog with the EU and the WEU in the spheres of domestic and security policy, as these institutions will determine the future of continental security policy; · the intensification of regional cooperation (particularly with neighboring countries' border regions) and leadership in the effective resolution of regional conflicts; · the realization of the strategic "European transport aircraft" project. This undertaking should be given proper state support and should symbolize Ukraine's ability to complete difficult high technology projects. Moreover, the success of the project would mean the freeing of European dependency on American strategic transport aviation. The new aircraft will seem especially attractive to member-states of the Euro-corps, which already have experience in using Ukrainian "Antonovs" in strategic maneuvers. 4. The creation of conditions necessary for the attraction of European investments. This direction will certainly demand the most serious efforts since it deals with fundamental changes in Ukrainian economic life. In the meanwhile, it would be prudent to consider the interstate patronage of investments, and measures that would prevent the over-indulgence of officials in servicing foreign investments in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine could take part in strategic European projects such as the "Trans-European Network" (the development of continental communication systems). The Federal Republic of Germany, which has vital economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe, could become Ukraine's prime strategic investment partner. The level and intensity of Ukrainian cooperation with West-European states are integrative indicators of the presence or absence of the government's political will to continue the policy of European integration, to conduct economic and political reforms, and to instill democratic norms and principles into Ukrainian life. It is also important to transform cooperation with West-European states into an active tool capable of ensuring one of the most important national state interests - survival in a competitive international environment, and the ensuring of the prosperity and security of the populace. b) The USA and Canada The main Western geopolitical priority after the disintegration of the USSR and the de-facto formation of a mono-polar world structure is the consolidation of victory and the consolidation and global spreading of western values, democratic principles and institutions, and the liberal-democratic ideology. It is characteristic that among the main geopolitical priorities of Euro-Atlantism, and first of all of the USA, are strict and pragmatic orientations concerning the limitation of adversaries' influence and the strengthening of strategic potential on regional and global levels. The above go together with measures intended to stabilize and spread traditional liberal-democratic values and institutions. Also of prime significance is the strategic political and economic strengthening of the Rimland. These are the reasons for NATO's present eastward expansion, plans for integrating CE and the Baltic states into the EU, the profound geopolitical importance of Ukraine's position, and western anxiety concerning the political and economic orientations of the Transcaucases and Central Asia. The prevention of Russia's transformation into a Eurasian regional hegemony hostile to the USA was declared as one of the USA's vital interests of the 21st century. This idea was presented in a well-known 1995 report, entitled "National Interests of the USA", prepared by Harvard University, the RAND Corporation and a number of other US analytical centers. Ukraine and the Baltic states are also included in the USA's zone of vital interests. The fundamental importance of preventing Russian aggression, pressure or blackmail toward these states is underlined in the paper as well. Another core document entitled "National Security Strategy in the Next Century", signed by President Clinton in May, 1997 stresses that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 12 new independent states, the Baltic states included, are of vital importance for US interests. US Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbot emphasized in June, 1997 that the Transcaucases and Central Asia are today also strategically important regions for the USA. Turkey plays a key role in this region as a leader in spreading Euro-Atlantic influence in counterbalance to the influence of Islamic fundamentalism (Iran) and Eurasian ideology in general, along the "Moscow-Teheran" strategic axis. Thus a strong basis exists to speak about the formation of a Baltic - Black Sea - the Caspian zone of US and Euro-Atlantic interests. Ukraine holds a key position in the South-Western flank of the Rimland and in fact controls the main transportation corridors between two spheres of civilization both in latitudinal as well as in longitudinal directions. This strategically important Ukrainian position can be effectively utilized (although this is not yet the case) for the implementation of Ukraine's basic national interests and its accelerated integration into European economic and political space and security structures. It can be stated without exaggeration that Ukraine's entry, or more correctly its return, to western civilization will significantly influence the entire geopolitical structure of the world. Leading western analysts unanimously affirm this fact. The priority of Ukraine's orientation toward integration into EU, WEU and NATO political structures, etc. has to be accompanied by a wide-ranging program of measures directed toward comprehensive integration into European socio-cultural space, and an openness not only to economic investments but also to cultural and informational ones. The policy concerning principal strategic partners (in the West as well as in the East) should be thoroughly reviewed. In a geopolitical sense US dependence on Ukraine is not much smaller, if not greater, than Ukrainian dependence on the US. The US, by the way, understands this. It would be good for Ukraine to understand this as well, and to also let the US understand, that it understands. Otherwise the repeat of the greatest Ukrainian error concerning strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is inevitable. The surrender of nuclear weapons was not a mistake. This was the only possible and correct decision. The mistake lay in giving up the weapons for practically nothing in exchange. American analysts maintain that Ukraine could have received much more, we stress much more, for the world's third most potent nuclear arsenal. This includes both economic aid as well as assistance with transformational changes. Ukraine's relations with the USA. The future of Ukraine will no doubt depend on its relations with the United States. Present relations have to be regarded as beginnings, even despite bilateral declarations that the partnership between the two states is strategic. The reason for this is, first of all, because of the undetermined character of these relations and in the unpredictability of each state for the other. The USA's undeterminate position concerning Ukraine is visible, first of all, in a noticeably inconsistent American-Ukrainian tactical course. Thus, George Bush's position after Ukraine's declaration of independence was too careful and, in fact, was reduced to being a policy, coordinated with Russia, for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Bill Clinton's administration, starting with support for Ukraine and the establishment of a strategic partnership has gradually and noticeably changed its course and has resorted to using Ukraine as a chip in the USA's game with Russia. It was the USA that at first supported the idea of a Ukraine-NATO Charter and then did much to prevent this document from being signed in a form that Ukraine was interested in. It was the USA that "hooked" Ukraine on the "drug" of aid and then played a leading role in considerably cutting foreign financial aid to Ukraine. Desperately needed in the time of the growing Russian monetary crisis foreign credits were forthcoming only after a considerable time-lag. Furthermore, Ukraine was presented with a whole new series of conditions, which were considerably more rigid than those demanded of Russia. The USA's double standard of policy toward Russia and Ukraine clearly emerged during the preparation and signing of the agreement concerning the reduction of conventional arms weaponry in Europe, in the issue concerning Ukraine-Iran cooperation, etc. The sudden change in American attitude toward Ukraine after the Bill Clinton - Boris Yeltsin summit in Helsinki in the spring of 1996 is also worth mentioning. It seems that the inconsistency of a tactical Ukrainian-American course is the direct result of an absence of a decided American strategic position concerning Ukraine. Ukraine's strategic line toward the USA is also vague. During his speech to students of the Diplomatic Academy, H. Udovenko, as then Head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defined the following, by now traditional, priority strategic directions of Ukraine's foreign policy: reintegration into European structures; the intensification of transatlantic cooperation with the world's developed states ("the G7", West-European states) and with the RF and other CIS states; cooperation with Central-Eastern European countries; with Latin American, Middle-Eastern and Central Asian, African and Asian-Pacific countries; activity in international organizations...". Thus, almost all world states and regions were seen in priority terms. Unfortunately, it is impossible to concentrate foreign political efforts in all directions at once, as Ukraine like any other state has limited means, especially considering all of its current hardships. The strategic line toward the USA has somehow become lost in the above-mentioned thesis about foreign political priorities, and has been timidly hidden in the phrase concerning transatlantic cooperation. Both indecision in intentions and unsureness in means can be hidden behind this phrase together with the desire to develop cooperation. This indetermination and unsureness together with, unfortunately, a lack of professionalism, are clearly seen in well-known to all Ukrainian tactical mistakes concerning the USA. The creation of a clear notion of Ukraine-US relations demands an awareness of the sense of "strategic partnership". At present, in addition to the US, Israel, Germany, and Poland have been declared as Ukraine's strategic partners. It is interesting to note that strategic partner Poland, that produces a GNP almost two hundred times smaller than our strategic partner the US, in 1996, for instance, had an exchange of goods level with Ukraine greater than that of the US. Its investment total was all of two times smaller. Relations on a strategic level are probably the relations, whose course and results determine whether the corresponding strategic goals of partners will be achieved. If this is true then it is possible to speak about an asymmetry in the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the US. In order to explain the reasons for this we will examine the national interests of Ukraine and of the US. In the overwhelming majority of directions in the European region these interests coincide with each other, or in the least, do not contradict each other (in opposition to the situation concerning Russia's national interests vis-à-vis both Ukraine and the US). The above is applicable to questions connected with the possibility of the formation of a new geopolitical power in the region, in opposition to the Euro-Atlantic community; with questions connected to NATO expansion; the general structure of European security; potential corridors for the transportation of Caspian oil; and Ukraine's potential geopolitical orientations. Namely, these corresponding interests can serve as a basis for Ukrainian-American strategic partnership. However, a fundamental difference in approach also exists. Ukraine views the US as its principal partner in its attempts at integration into European economic, political, and security structures. Ukraine for the US is only a tool, or to be more exact, one of many tools in its grand geopolitical game with Russia. A popular thesis among Ukrainian, and not only Ukrainian, analysts, is one that holds that an improvement in Ukrainian-US relations occurs only in the case of worsening Russian-US relations, and that the reverse situation also holds true. Undoubtedly, however, today the main destiny of Ukraine as a tool of US policy is, first of all, its role in manipulations with Russia. Thus H.Kissinger and Z.Brzezinski regard Ukraine's role to be of great importance for the USA, but still consider the results of the emergence and existence of independent Ukraine through the prism of Russia. Z.Brzezinski writes that independent Ukraine's emergence is one of the three most important geopolitical events of the 20th century, as it indicated the end of imperialist Russia 1 . H.Kissinger 2 acknowledges that the role of Ukraine is "of crucial importance" for the US, because "after the establishment of reforms Russia continues to produce reasons that arouse doubt as to the real ability of this state and its leaders to abandon former expansionist traditions". 1 Z.Brzezinski, Suchasnist' , 1992, No 9. 2 H.Kissinger, Diplomatiya. - Moscow, Ladomir, 1997. After winning the Cold War and having broken the imperialistic essence of the Russian Federation the "idea" of American manipulations of Russia consists of preventing Russia from losing its influence in Europe and Asia. After all, Europe with the EU, and Asia with China are two important geopolitical theaters where the US is struggling to maintain its present and future world dominance. The US, thus, is the only superpower in the world that is truly able to conduct, and exert, direct and indirect multilateral (with the help of international organizations, Europe, Japan, and even Russia, etc.) influence over Ukraine. It is logical to affirm that strategic partnership with this - only such state in the world - has to become priority number one of Ukrainian foreign policy. And thanks to the USA's unique means and role the pre-eminence of our transatlantic priority will not only not contradict our general line toward strong regional policy, but will indeed even promote it. In terms of geopolitics Ukraine has to place itself as a player on the US side in Europe. This, however, in no way excludes the necessity for the comprehensive maintenance and development of equal mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Ukraine has to build its relations with Russia in order not to give Russia a reason to renew its imperialistic ambitions. German political scientist K. Grobe writes: "...a westward oriented Ukraine could become... a source of spreading stability into other "difficult" regions of the former USSR. This would be beneficial for Russia". Ukraine represents a vitally important factor in the formation of a new geopolitical power on the territory of the former USSR. Russia understands this and actively strives to pull Ukraine over to its side. More importantly, Russia constantly outplays the US, which is always late on the scene. While the US discussed issues concerning the freezing of aid to Ukraine and promoted a blockade of new international credits, Russia actively and systematically increased its presence in Ukraine and aspired to establish direct or indirect control over all strategically important enterprises and spheres of production. This is the case even when today such a tactic proves to be economically unprofitable. This concerns oil-gas pipelines as well as strategically important industrial plants, together with key objects of the military-industrial complex. Russian pressure to involve Ukraine in military-technical cooperation with states of the Tashkent Treaty is on the increase. Russian attempts to establish control over the Ukrainian mass-media are especially alarming. At a certain stage these processes can become irreversible. President Kwasniewski of Poland (in Zeshuv, in May, 1998) was entirely correct in stating that the window of opportunity for helping Ukraine is closing. At present the issue concerning the stabilization of the territorial integrity of Russia appears as one of its thorniest problems. The state's predicament is complicated by governmental and social instability, set against the background of an economic crisis. Russian state bodies are weak and unsure of themselves. The armed forces, according to Defense Minister I. Sergeev, are battle-ready only "in places". The Institute for Defense Studies ("INOBIS") of the Russian Federation openly recommends to the State Defense Council making nuclear tactical weapons the cornerstone of Russia's defense. However, the use of nuclear weapons against neighbors (at issue are tactical weapons) is suicidal for a state where the government shows discord well before the start of any war. Thus, Russia's territorial integrity cannot be guaranteed by its (insufficient) present potential, but by a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, with Russian participation in it. Despite the abyss that separates Russia and NATO, the realities of life push both sides toward rapprochement. Z. Brzezinski has written about the growing economic potential of China as a reason, first of all for Russia, to seek such rapprochement. The "American" dimension of Ukraine's policy has to exist in connection with policy concerning NATO. NATO has not yet developed into a pan-European security system. However, it has already lost its adversaries - the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The Partnership for Peace Program as well as eastward expansion of the Atlantic organization were undoubtedly initiated and carried through by the US, as the alternative to NATO expansion was its folding. The US supported the growth of NATO, first of all, in order to remain in Europe in a political sense in conditions when the strengthening of an integrative Europe has created a repelling effect for the US. Thus, NATO today appears as an "anchor" for the political (including military) presence of the US in Europe. If so, closer Ukrainian ties with NATO mean closer ties with the US. This is the reason why the recommendations of professionals who continue to insist that Ukraine should conduct a more decided policy concerning NATO are accurate. Strategic partnership between Ukraine and the USA under any conditions, if it is strategic, should be filled with real content, not with declarations. Ukraine is internally ready for reforms on all levels. Only a push is needed. It is difficult to disagree with the western position that reforms rather than discussions about reforms are needed. However, funds are necessary to conduct reforms. The West has these funds and they can be provided in the form of credits. Otherwise the realization of the so-called "Belarus' option" is entirely possible. There is no doubt that the loss of Belarus' represents one of the biggest western strategic mistakes since the end of the Cold War. Belarus' had a democratic government and sought western support and aid, which is did not obtain. As a result Belarus' became practically lost to the West. Taking into account Ukraine's possible role in Russia's transformation into a new empire, the consequences in the Ukrainian case could be much more serious. More active western, particularly US, support for Ukrainian efforts to diversify the sources of energy supply and to ensure the transportation of at least part of the Caspian oil flow via Ukraine is needed. This, by the way, is economically the most profitable route and an alternative to the Russian route. For Ukraine, the diversification of sources of energy supply means first of all the freedom of political choice, particularly in the sphere of integration into European economic and security structures. Decisive measures should be taken by both Ukraine and the US in order to ensure the mutual transparency of policy. This is especially true in the sphere of relations with Russia. The fact that the American side is concerned about certain aspects of Ukrainian Russian military-technical cooperation has been stressed many times. At the same time Ukraine is no less concerned about the thick mist surrounding American-Russian agreements that deal with the division of spheres of interest in CE and in the former USSR. Finally, it is clear that if the USA is Ukraine's strategic partner number one, bilateral relations between Ukraine and the USA must be regarded as being of prime importance. The development of Ukrainian-American business should be given adequate attention in light of President's Kuchma's requirement of the "economization" of our foreign policy. American business is searching for opportunities to penetrate into Ukraine and to take root here. However, the current domestic atmosphere for foreign business is in no way conducive for facilitating these opportunities. The establishment of effective economic (as well as other) bilateral relations between Ukraine and the USA demands not only actualization and an increase in economic goal-oriented action by the Ukrainian embassy in Washington, or the replacement of certain officials. Measures of a systematic character that would unite legislative, economic, informational, diplomatic, etc. efforts are necessary. The concept of relations with the world's number one state has to be developed and all components of this concept should be subject to planned coordination. Only this way can lead to the transformation of relations with the USA from the beginning stage of indetermination to the level of productive long-term interaction that will prove beneficial for "all states of the region". In contradistinction to the USA, Canada is an average (according to its status in international relations) country. However, despite this and despite its overseas geographical position, the establishment of active relations with this state is of great importance for Ukraine. Its economic means do not represent Canada's main attractiveness, as Canada is integrated into the North-American region on the basis of the CAFTA and NAFTA treaties, and the functioning of the Canadian economy is limited by the borders of this region. Two external overseas functions of Canadian economic organization are trade and the export of capital. They occur in Western Europe and South-East Asia, to where the majority of non-continental export is directed. At the same time Central Europe remains in a marginal position and is situated far from the sphere of direct and immediate Canadian interest. Thus, it is not expected that the Canadian economy will achieve a high level of economic linkage with "marginal" Central Europe, including Ukraine. The presence of a large Ukrainian Diaspora, Canadian activity in international organizations and an inclination toward programs of aid for Central Europe are specific Canadian strong points (from the point of view of the importance of relations with Canada). Canada's participation in OSCE, NATO, the G-7 is an example of Canadian activity in international organizations. Thus, Canada plays a particular role in the process of the distribution of western aid. Canada plays the role of mediator, coordinator and initiator of western aid at meetings of the G-7, of Ministers of Finance, of the directors of the central banks of the 10 largest financial donors to post-communist states, and of the 24 developed industrial states. Canada's inclination toward aid programs can be explained by the fact that the political and economic relations of this country with Central Europe are not and will not become either close or active. Thus, the amount of Canada-Ukraine trade (according to 1996 data) consisted of 8 million dollars, while the amount of aid reached 56 million dollars. It is necessary to take into account that Canadian help to Central European states as a percentage of its GNP exceeds the levels of aid of its partners in the G7. Canadian programs of technical aid to Ukraine are connected with the following priorities: democratic development, government administration, development of the private sector, agricultural farming, health care, nuclear (energy) security, and the ecology. The successful resolution of problems dealing with human rights is one of the most important conditions for obtaining aid and augmenting its level. All of the above-mentioned dimensions of aid correspond to Ukrainian national interests and should thus receive the comprehensive support of our national government. It is possible to outline the most promising spheres of Ukrainian cooperation with this state taking into account Canadian activity and authority in international organizations. Ukraine and Canada can actively cooperate within multilateral international organizations. First of all, this concerns the OSCE and the joint participation of Canadian and Ukrainian diplomacy in the regulation of regional conflicts, especially in peacekeeping operations. Moving toward a more comprehensive integration into the world community, Ukraine should appeal to Canada as a mediator. Canadian diplomacy can become a connective link between Ukraine and the G-7 states, promote the adjustment of Ukraine-Russia contradictions, bring Ukraine closer to NATO states, and provide advocacy for Ukraine in international financial institutions. The adaptation of Canadian foreign political experience should become an even more important sphere of Ukrainian-Canadian cooperation, as Ukrainian experience in international relations is insufficient. In this regard Canadian experience of accommodating relations with a powerful large neighbor can prove to be very useful. Many analysts advise Ukraine to build its relations with Russia using Canadian-American relations as a model. Canadian experience testifies that the only substantial counterbalance to US influence is not an orientation toward a single state, but active participation in international relations and mainly in multidimensional international organizations. Thus, in its relations with a large state, an average state like Ukraine should rely more on the principles of internationalism and multilateralism rather than on the principle of a "balance of power" 1 . Consequently, the development of relations with Canada as well as with the USA initiates not only the effect of self-sufficiency but also the effect of the strengthening of one's own positions toward neighboring Russia. Finally, let us emphasize economic relations between Ukraine and Canada: despite their low level and doubtful potential they should be developed, as economic interaction and not the milking of aid constitutes normal relations between two states. The possibility of the growth of effective economic cooperation between the two countries is obvious. It has already been initiated by Canada as a whole, as well as by separate provinces (Quebec, Saskitchewan, etc.). c) Euro-Atlantic Structures At present it is possible to define four main options for Ukrainian policy concerning Euro-Atlantic structures and structures of regional security: 1. Relying on one's own forces. 2. Joining an existent bloc or alliance. 1 S.Kononenko, CEE in the System of Current Foreign Policy of Canada, Doctor Thesis, Kyiv, 1996. 3. Creating regional security structures within a framework of a broader universal system of general European security. 4. Neutrality: a) support of the existent status of self proclaimed neutrality; b) permanent neutrality, guaranteed by world nuclear powers or by the UN Security Council; c) active neutrality, distinctive relations with NATO and orientations toward the EU and the WEU. These options of national security policy are not alternatives in the strict sense of this word. Some of them can come into being in different combinations or can be transformed from one into another. They also have different weight from the point of view of the possibility of their realization. Many of these options are "prohibited" because of various economic and political reasons or certain Acts of Parliament. For instance, the first option is "prohibited" because of at least two reasons. It is well known that the national security of a state of Ukraine's size and geopolitical position can be ensured either with the help of a powerful (nuclear, if possible) potential of deterrence or by participation in influential and strong military blocs or alliances. Ukraine's rejection of nuclear deterrence and its joining of the NPT have practically canceled the opportunity of realizing the first option. Moreover, purely economic limits exclude the possibility in the nearest future of the development of a conventional potential of deterrence able to protect Ukrainian national interests with its own forces. The second option is also currently blocked by the Declaration of Independence, according to which Ukraine should become a "non-nuclear and permanently neutral state, which does not participate in military blocs". It should be mentioned that it would not be difficult to change this regulation, as the majority of the Ukrainian ruling élite have already understood the danger of the simultaneous establishment of both a non-nuclear and non-bloc state. Regardless, in the nearest future this option will remain conditionally prohibited for Ukraine. However, entry into NATO and the WEU, at least in partial forms, becomes a real possibility in a more distant future, after the year 2000. The idea of the creation of regional security structures in CE is not new, having being discussed since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Proposals concerning the creation of "NATO-Bis" (by Polish President L.Walesa in 1991-1992) and "zones of stability and security" (by Ukrainian President L.Kravchuk ) together with other numerous proposals to form a "Baltic-Black Sea security belt" were a natural response of the political leaders of different states to the perception of an existent vacuum in regional security. It is important that all these initiatives were not directed against a particular country and were not meant to replace existent structures such as OSCE, NATO or the WEU. Regional security structures can potentially become subsystems of a more general European security system. They can make a significant contribution toward the introduction of a "division of work" between OSCE, NATO and the WEU in the framework of the popular in Europe concept of "interlocking institutions". Unfortunately, it is must be acknowledged that the plans and processes of NATO enlargement have considerably undermined the altogether sound idea of regional security structures. Current changes in the general political climate in Europe can lead to the resurgence of this idea in a new geopolitical situation. The Tallinn meeting of the presidents of the Baltic states, of Poland and of Ukraine became the first, yet very important, step in this direction. Moreover, having ensured their joining of NATO, states of the Vishegrad group, first of all Poland, will probably renew their interest in the creation of new regional security structures. In the final outcome, this extremely important to Ukraine and the Baltic states idea would be brought into existence. Neutrality as the fourth option can be attained in at least three different versions. The "weakest" version is the prolongation of the existing status of unilateral self-proclaimed neutrality and the staying out of blocs. Under conditions of NATO expansion and the "de facto" western recognition (independent of "political games" in Helsinki) of post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of "special interests" and "special responsibility", Ukraine can become very vulnerable to political, economic and military Russian pressure and can be forced toward a gradual political and military integration with this country. The second version, permanent neutrality guaranteed by the "great powers"or by the Security Council of the UN, is much more acceptable from the point of view of Ukrainian interests. Austria has had this kind of status since 1955. It should be mentioned that Ukraine has already obtained security assurances at Budapest's summit of the OSCE. Continuing consolidation of these obligations can be regarded as a next important step in the ensuring of stability and security of CE. However, a problem exists in that Russia will probably block any attempts to grant this status to Ukraine, as this development of events departs "too far" even from the program of "finlandization". On the other hand, such Russian behavior can only push Ukraine (as has already happened with other states) to closer relations with Euro-Atlantic military-political structures. So-called active neutrality, distinctive partnership with NATO, and a course toward political membership in this organization together with an orientation toward the EU and the WEU is probably the most rational and "best possible" Ukrainian strategic response. "Active neutrality" here means a status similar to the Swedish one in its relations with European security structures. In this case officially neutral Ukraine gradually and systematically increases the level of its cooperation with NATO in the framework of the EAPC, the PfP and in relations of a distinctive partnership. The signing of a Charter between Ukraine and NATO became an important step in this process. Issues concerning Ukraine's joining NATO as a full-fledged member under the conditions of distinctive partnership, political assurances from NATO and the general course toward integration into the EU and the WEU will lose their actuality and can remain open for only another 5-10 years. These questions will depend on the success of Ukrainian economic reforms and on the general development of the geopolitical situation in Europe and in Russia. At the same time, this course will objectively weaken Russian opportunities for involving Ukraine in its zone of domination and will prevent new political "games" concerning the division of CE into "zones of influence". In these conditions Ukraine can remain a non-bloc state for only a certain period of time. L. Kuchma justly emphasized in Madrid that today this position is advantageous to a number of our Western and Eastern neighbors. Ukraine's role here can be described in different ways: as a "key link in the European security system" (J. Solana), as "a bridge between the East and the West" (L. Kuchma), as a "cross-road with two-way traffic" (V. Horbulin). A dozen more euphemisms can be invented but the essence of the matter will not change. Most important is the fact that Ukraine today has no other alternative, because of its geopolitical and domestic political and economic situations. Second, the main Ukrainian national interest - political survival and a course toward integration into European space - corresponds to this status and to this role, and the West is well aware of this fact. Ukrainian independence (military inclusive) and territorial integrity has already become one of the main components of a future vision of Europe and of the entire Atlantic community. Ukrainian geopolitical orientations will have an important influence on any attempts to build a new regional security structure in the region. These orientations will significantly depend not only on the West's words and assurances but also on its real actions in support of the Ukrainian process of internal transformation as well as of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Relations between Ukraine and NATO have fundamental importance in the sphere of peacekeeping activity, which takes place under the UN's political management. A Ukrainian military contingent participates in SFOR stabilizing forces, operatively led by NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This participation opens additional opportunities for more active Ukrainian involvement in the "privileged" sphere of peacemaking. The development of relations with NATO can also have indirect effects. Connections between Ukraine and other partner-states increase because of Ukrainian participation in the EAPC and PfP programs. Direct Ukraine-NATO relations can have a positive, from the point of view of Ukrainian national interests, "balancing", and if necessary "restraining" effect on its relations with Russia. The West's position toward Ukraine within the context of NATO expansion demands a more detailed analysis and remains one of the most delicate issues that is to be solved by western as well as by eastern politicians, analysts and other representatives of government and academic circles. The issue of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Alliance in the nearest future is practically out of the question. This fact underscores the necessity for both Ukraine and the West to develop a strategic course directed toward the strengthening of Ukrainian independence and toward assuring Ukraine's development according to the western model. This problem is to be solved by Ukraine and by the West. Ukrainian leaders fear that eastward NATO expansion can leave Ukraine in a "gray zone", where it will feel Russian pressure as before and will lack protection from possible Russian neo-imperialistic ambitions. NATO has often announced that the enlargement of the military-political union will lead to the enhancement of European security and will not create new lines of division. This statement will gain force if an appropriate place in general western strategy is found for Ukraine. The Ukrainian issue in light of NATO expansion inevitably refracts in the domestic policies of Russia, the USA and other European states. This issue is to become an important factor of NATO actions and in relations between the West and Russia. The western attitude toward Ukraine continues to be rather ambiguous. Many Europeans deep in their hearts are not sure if Ukraine is a "real country" and are not inclined toward investing significant funds in stabilizing Ukraine, even more so because of the number of economic problems that have beset their own countries. Others are worried that too much western attention to Ukraine can cause Russian counteraction and will complicate relations with Moscow, which are already strained because of NATO expansion. In other words, seven years have passed since Ukraine declared independence and there is still no clear unified understanding in the West of Ukraine's place and role in the European security system after the end of the Cold War. Ukraine is not a member of the West-European Union or of the European Union. According to western analysts (Stephen Larrabee, "The Complicated Equilibristics of Ukraine", Survival , special issue, autumn 1996) it is doubtful that Ukraine will join them in the near future, if it is ever going to join them. At the same time Kyiv continues to remain in serious economic dependence on Russia and continues to fall under its growing pressure, as Russia uses political and economic levers to limit the choices of Ukrainian decisions and security. Thus, Ukraine continues to remain in a strategically desperate situation, torn between a drive toward closer relations with the West and persistent RF efforts to involve Ukraine in its sphere of interests. Neutrality continues to be the official Ukrainian policy. Ukrainian state officials have no reservations as to NATO expansion. They have supported the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO, emphasizing that no state has the right of veto over another state's participation in a military-political alliance. At the same time, however, they have called for gradual, evolutionary expansion, maintaining that NATO has to take into account the security interests of other states that do not participate in the bloc, particularly those of Ukraine. In the opinion of Ukrainian officials, a more cautious process of expansion will give Ukraine time to stabilize itself and will reduce the chances for its transformation into a buffer between Russia and an enlarged NATO. It will also permit the formation of a new European security system and will promote NATO's transformation from an organization oriented toward collective defense into a structure that guarantees collective security. In other words, Ukrainian strategy continues to be directed toward the gaining of time and the maintenance of the opportunity to choose (to the benefit of western priorities). At present Ukraine will not be applying to joining NATO (E.Primakov's visit to Ukraine in May, 1998). Ukrainian officials understand that such a step can be interpreted by Russia as a provocation and can lead to an intensification of political as well as economic pressure on Ukraine. At the present stage the "coerced" Ukrainian refusal to join NATO causes the necessity for the development of a reliable strategy for relations with the West concerning the support of the security and independence of Ukraine. Four political and strategic imperatives should be taken into consideration here. First, the West should support Ukraine and prevent the formation of a "Korean syndrome" that could take place in Ukraine, if NATO's policy of enlargement leads to a split of Ukrainian society into groups of proponents and opponents of Ukraine's entry into NATO. Opinion polls of the last months (see appendix) convincingly testify to the growing favorable attitude of the population of all of Ukraine's regions toward integration into NATO). The second imperative (irremovably connected with the first) is the necessity to foresee the possible influence of the enlargement of the Alliance on regional security in Central Europe and, particularly, on states that do not belong to the first wave of enlargement (there is an opinion that the second wave may not occur in the nearest decade, therefore this is the time-frame the West would need to "digest" new members of the Alliance). The next, third imperative, states the necessity of allowing easier access to the European Union for Central European states by way of solving questions concerning their security. There is no doubt that key instances of non-concurrence of political positions present in discussions concerning EU enlargement are connected with the division of financial responsibilities among members of the union and the process of economic reforms in candidate-states. Official representatives of the EU admit that entry of Central European states into the union seems to be impossible without the definition of all the arising consequences in the security and defense spheres. The fourth imperative is more actual for NATO member-states. Any strategy concerning Ukraine should correspond not only to NATO's internal political needs but also to the principle of consensus, recognized to be the leading principle in the NATO decision-making process. In a wider context, the solution of the Ukrainian issue will be regarded as the main test of the resolve of repeatedly declared assurances of the North Atlantic Alliance that its enlargement will strengthen the security of new members as well as stability in Europe in general. Relations between Russia and the West, therefore, should be considered together with the Ukrainian issue. Precisely Ukrainian questions are destined to become a complicated and delicate issue in negotiations between Russia and NATO as well as in the Russia-USA dialog. "Careless" NATO enlargement can complicate the problems of Ukrainian security and cause Russian counteraction. The latter can appear by way of efforts to accelerate integrative processes, together with all of the negative results of this development of events. In order to correspond to the above-mentioned frequently contradictory imperatives, NATO strategy concerning Ukraine should be based on several complementary principles and should take into account the priorities of all interested sides. Conditioned by a proper level of coordination, the cumulative effect of all strategic compounds will exceed the arithmetical sum of the results of separate components. The following factors could become the key components of future strategy: The support of political and economic reforms . The process of reform constitutes practically the basic grounds for the future independence and security of Ukraine. Its political as well as economic success is the core pre-condition for Ukrainian independence, Ukraine's integration into the western world and for western support of Ukrainian foreign political efforts. The faster Ukraine moves along the road to domestic political and economic reforms, the more probable will be possible western aid. In the case of the success of internal reforms, it will be easier for Ukraine to integrate into European structures. Moreover, successful reforms will reinforce its independence and will distance it from its Soviet past. On the other hand, the slowing down of the process of reform remains as a dangerous barrier in the way of successful advancement of the Ukrainian state into the western world. Results achieved so far impress, but it is evident that much more remains to be done, both in the political sphere, and especially in the economic sphere. Defense cooperation with NATO . Cooperation in the defense and security realms should also become an important component of any strategy called upon to strengthen Ukrainian independence. It is natural that the regional security of Central European states should commence in the East, meaning with those countries that are geographically situated along the eastern borders of Europe and still remain in the process of the creation and development of their own national security and defense systems. At present the armed attack of any state on its neighbor seems impossible, but its full exclusion would be a mistake. Against this background, NATO should help Ukraine by consolidating existent agreements concerning military cooperation and the mutual protection of regional security. In the situation where ideas concerning the usefulness of joining the Alliance do not always concur among members of the country's political élite, broadened military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO deserves support as a stage along the way to a more effective system of regional security and defense. Mutual military cooperation will, first, promote the more effective defense construction of the Ukrainian state and, second, will create conditions necessary for the normal advancement of Ukraine toward a western model of development, regardless of Ukraine's joining the Alliance. Finally, from the political point of view it is important for Ukraine to demonstrate that it is not an observer of European events, but an active participant in the construction of a European security structure. Ukrainian cooperation with other Central European states . In order to take root as a European state along with a corresponding orientation, Ukraine should strengthen its relations with other Central European states and organizations such as the Vishegrad group and the Central European Initiative (CEI) (F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-254-USDP, 1993], pp. 105-108). This process, however, is occurring relatively slowly. The majority of Central European officials do not always regard Ukraine as a "Central European" state, either from a cultural, or from a political point of view. Moreover, the Ukrainian economy is less developed than the economies of some other Central European states. Thus, although Central Europe fully supports Ukrainian independence, it does not hurry in accepting Ukraine's propositions, especially those concerning regional cooperation. Ukrainian efforts to establish closer structural relations with the Vishegrad group were met with little enthusiasm, mainly due to the slow development of economic reforms in Ukraine. A good number of Central European state figures fear that Ukrainian membership in the Vishegrad group can destroy the group's solidarity and introduce undesired complications into relations with Russia. This is the reason for the cool reaction to Ukrainian propositions for establishing closer ties on an organizational level. Nevertheless, this situation is gradually changing. As long as NATO and the EU keep expanding and including new members from Central Europe, Central European linkages will carry even more weight. Closer relations with Central Europe could strengthen Ukraine's European orientation and help decrease its dependence on Russia and the CIS. Today there is no doubt that the Ukrainian road to Europe lies through Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. Ukrainian entry into the EU . The enlargement of the European Union has to become an important, if not the most important, component of Ukrainian strategy toward the West. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian membership, or at least associate membership, in the EU would be ideal. However, at the present stage the status of full membership for Ukraine does not measure up to EU demands. Nevertheless, over the last few years a whole series of important steps was made directed toward strengthening Ukrainian connections with Europe. In July, 1994 the European Union signed a treaty on partnership with Ukraine. This was the first treaty of its kind signed with a member of the CIS. This treaty guarantees Ukraine most favorable nation status and includes a promise to consider the question concerning the creation of a free trade zone in 1998, in the case of Ukraine demonstrating sufficient progress in the construction of a stable economy (which in our opinion, unfortunately, has not occurred). However, in contradistinction to treaties regarding associate membership signed with Central European and Baltic states, there was nothing said in this document about possible Ukrainian membership in the EU. Ukraine's associate membership in the EU could fundamentally change the whole situation and today appears as one of the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy. In November, 1995 Ukraine achieved an important step on its road of advancement toward European structures in becoming the second, after Moldova, CIS state that has been included into the ranks of the Council of Europe. In its decision The Council clearly recognized the progress Ukraine has made, after gaining independence in 1991, in the construction of a pluralistic, democratic society, with adherence to human rights principles. The fact that Ukraine became a member of the Council earlier than Russia, whose application was being considered at the time and was accepted only in January 1996, caused certain aggravation in Moscow. Relations between Ukraine and the West-European Union consist of a regular exchange of visits and information. On May 9, 1994 the Council of WEU ministers agreed in the Kirshberg Declaration to provide associate partner status to those countries that had already signed or would soon be signing agreements regarding associate membership in the EU. Six Eastern European states plus the Baltic countries, but not Ukraine, were in this group. Such a position on the part of EC and WEU bureaucrats, as was underlined by president Kuchma in Vienna in October 1998, can lead to the creation of new division lines in Europe, in that number along the Polish-Ukrainian border. The "open door" strategy . The possibility of Ukrainian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty (in the case of a corresponding decision on the state level) should become the next key aspect of western strategy concerning Ukraine. Some western analysts believe that in 2010 and even earlier Ukraine will meet NATO standards. (Z. Brzezinski, Kyiv, May 1998). It should be mentioned that the absence of an opportunity to join NATO can create a great deal of political damage to Ukraine and undermine current Ukrainian reform processes. Thus, while accepting new members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) into the North Atlantic Alliance it would make sense for the Alliance to discuss possible candidates of the "second phase". The "second phase" should consist of new Central European states and states of the former USSR that have expressed their will to become full-fledged members of the Alliance. In our opinion, members of NATO should at least analyze the difficulties and hardships that lie in the way of these states' (Ukraine included) possibilities for membership in the Alliance. These actions must be based on the thesis that these countries separately will not be able to overcome the numerous problems that lie along this road. Thus, NATO states could take important preventive measures in solving these problems and in elaborating a specific strategic course for each potential member of the Alliance. « previous page | content | next page » top Web ukrainetrek.com CONTENTS Annotation Foreword Preface Main Conclusions and Recommendations Strategic Priorities of Ukrainian National Security and Foreign Policy for the Future (O.Honcharenko, B.Parakhonsky) I. Theoretical Backgrounds (O.Honcharenko, O.Strekal) II. Ukraine in Core Geopolitical Outlines 1. Geopolitical Priorities of the Main World Powers and Ukraine (O.Honcharenko, B.Parakhonsky) 2. The USA and the North Atlantic Community - Ukraine - the Russian Federation (B.Parakhonsky) 3. Europe - the USA - the Islamic World - Ukraine - the Russian Federation (B.Parakhonsky) 4. The Asian-Pacific Region - the USA - the Russian Federation - Ukraine (A.Honcharuk, S.Nikishenko, B.Parakhonsky) III. Regional Directions and Peculiarities of Ukraine's Geopolitical Strategy 1. The North-East Axis a) The Russian Federation (R.Zhanhozha, V.Kuzmenko) b) The Present State and Future of the CIS (B.Parakhonsky, O.Honcharenko) 2. The Euro-Atlantic Axis a) The Countries of Western Europe and the Problems of Ukraine's European Integration (O.Strekal) b) The USA and Canada (E.Lysytsyn, O.Honcharenko) c) Euro-Atlantic Structures (O.Manachynsky, A.Soboliev, O.Honcharenko) 3. Central Europe and the Baltic States (O.Strekal, O.Honcharenko) 4. The Black Sea Region a) Ukraine in the Black Sea Region (B.Parakhonsky) b) The Balkan Axis (B.Parakhonsky, V.Kuznetsov, O.Manachynsky) c) The Caucasian Region. The Formation of the GUAM System (B.Parakhonsky, V.Malarov) d) Ukraine and Turkey (B.Parakhonsky) 5. The South-East Axis a) The Middle East (B.Parakhonsky) b) Central and South Asia (B.Parakhonsky) 6. The Asian-Pacific Region (S.Nikishenko, A.Honcharuk) 7. Other Important Regions and Countries (O.Honcharenko, B.Parakhonsky) IV. Alternative Scenarios for the Future of Ukraine (O.Honcharenko) Appendix. A Sociological Study of Ukraine's Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Orientations and its National Security Policy (O.Potiekhin, O.Parakhonska) The National Institute for Strategic Studies The National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations Abbreviations All Rights Reserved © 2006. TrekThemAll holding, Inc. This site is not affiliated with any government entity associated with a name similar to the site domain name. Visit: Kazakhstan facts: map, flag, history, oil, food, people and more! AboutKazakhstan.com