Jane's Intelligence Digest,
United Kingdom,
Friday, 3 November 2006
On 11 October, President Viktor Yushchenko ordered the Security Service of
Ukraine (SBU) to upgrade its operational activities in the Crimea.
The SBU was given two months to, 'look into the efficiency of intelligence,
counterintelligence and operative measures in order to identify, prevent and
halt intelligence, subversive and other illegal activities in the Crimea by
foreign secret services and NGOs'.
The SBU was also ordered to develop a plan of action to, 'neutralise'
activities in the Crimea, 'which harm Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, pose security threats and incite ethnic, racial and religious
tension'.
Russia's subversive tactics in supporting separatism among ethnic Russians
in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine are long standing. Kiev's ability to
launch counter-measures are hampered by two factors, as clearly noticeable
during the well-organised anti-US and anti-NATO demonstrations in the
Crimea.
[1] There is a lack of political will by Yushchenko and within the
presidential secretariat and the National Security and Defense Council
(NRBO) to tackle the separatist threat.
These two institutions are the president's two remaining levers of influence
following this year's constitutional reforms that transferred much of
presidential powers to parliament.
[2] Second, there are divided loyalties between Kiev and Moscow within the
SBU and Interior Ministry (MVS). In 1994-1995 President Leonid Kuchma
successfully used non-violent tactics implemented by the SBU and the NRBO to
marginalise Crimea's separatist voices.
Following a decade of rampant corruption under Kuchma, including the SBU's
involvement in arms trafficking and repression of the opposition reminiscent
of the Soviet KGB, the SBU's competence is now in doubt.
In the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, regions loyal to pro-Russian Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions, the local SBU branches remain
highly sceptical of Yushchenko. Further, the Crimean parliament, dominated
by the Party of Regions, has often disregarded Yushchenko's directives.
Under Kuchma a number of officials from Russia were declared persona non
grata for short periods in retaliation for inciting separatism in Ukraine.
Under Yushchenko, Kiev's official policy has hardened, especially following
the June protests in the Crimea where Russian politicians gave inflammatory
speeches.
After Yushchenko's inauguration in January 2005 former senior Kuchma-era
officials sought refuge in the Crimea.
In March 2006, the Party of Regions and its three extreme left allies - the
Communist Party, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Union party - swept
elections to the Ukrainian and the Crimean parliaments, gaining over 70 per
cent of the vote in the Crimea. Many of the former Kuchma figures re-entered
the political stage on the back of the election wins of Party of Regions.
These three political constituencies have allied with Russian intelligence
(FSB) and the Black Sea Fleet's intelligence (GRU) and military officers to
incite anti-US and anti-NATO demonstrations, pickets and rallies in the
Crimea.
These reached a crescendo in June and led to the first ever cancellation of
joint military exercises with the US and with other NATO countries through
its Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. These exercises had been
regularly held in the Crimea and in military bases in western Ukraine since
1997.
Russia has supplied intelligence on the location and plans for military
exercises and has given personnel to increase attendance at the rallies and
demonstrations. During the June rallies many of the leading organisers were
spouses of serving Russian Black Sea Fleet officers.
Russia is also involved in attempts to incite inter-ethnic strife in the
Crimea by fomenting clashes between Tatars and Russian-speaking Slavs.
The presidential secretariat has told JID of its fears that Russia is
attempting to 'Abkhasize' the Crimea by repeating its successful tactics in
Georgia's two frozen conflicts, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The presidential secretariat has told JID that it has reports from loyal SBU
officers who have reported financial support being given to ethnic Russian
nationalist NGOs in the Crimea.
Logistical support is given to these groups by the Black Sea Fleet and by
nationalist youth groups from Russia who are dedicated to the Kremlin, such
as Nashi, a pro-Vladimir Putin NGO that has been involved in racist and
anti-Georgian violence in Russia.
RUSSIA'S STRATEGY IS TWO FOLD
[1] First, to foment instability in the Crimea to halt Ukraine's drive to
join NATO. The anti-NATO and anti-US rallies in June in the Crimea have
reinforced the concerns of those NATO members that deem Kiev's
membership aspiration in the organisation as impracticable in the near future.
[2] Second, Moscow seem to want to make use of increased political
volatility in the Crimea as a way to pressure Kiev to seek its assistance
which would enhance its leverage over its weaker and anxious neighbour. In
late October, President Putin offered to provide assistance to Ukraine if
Slav-Tatar tension increased in the Crimea.
Such protection would be reminiscent of similar tactics in Georgia's two
separatist enclaves where Russia first incited inter-ethnic tension and then
offered 'CIS' (in reality Russian) 'peacekeeping troops' who have frozen the
conflict in Moscow's favour. As Putin said, 'Russia cannot be indifferent to
what happens in Ukraine and the Crimea'.
Related to this question, is Russia's tactics of organising a lobby within
the Crimea and Ukrainian government to support its calls to extend the
twenty year lease for Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.
The lease was negotiated in 1997 as part of a package of documents that
obtained Russian recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and is set to expire in 2017.
Ukraine's constitution bans foreign bases but made a 'temporary' exception
with the Black Sea Fleet. The Anti-Crisis coalition, uniting the Party of
Regions, Socialists and Communists, has 240 deputies and is therefore unable
to change these constitutional provisions, which would require 300 votes.
Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, a Yushchenko loyalist, has rejected
extending the 20 year lease and turned down offers of security assistance
from Russia. Prime Minister Yanukovych has supported negotiations to extend
the Russian base agreement beyond 2017.
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